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ABstrAct  this article examines contemporary arguments and counter-arguments about 
zoning and power rotation, and the overall implications of these principles for the consolidation 
of democracy in nigeria. Because geopolitical zone structures roughly approximate to ethno-
national groups, they play a central aggregating role in nigeria’s body politic. however, argu-
ments about zoning and power rotation tend to undermine the geopolitical system and bolster 
the nation’s north/south division. the death of President Umaru musa yar’Adua in 2010 
opened a “Pandora’s box” of intrigue within nigeria’s political elite. in the run-up to the 2011 
nigerian presidential election, logics of ethnicity, geopolitical zones, and geographic dichoto-
mization were employed as justifications for claiming the presidency. Post-election riots and 
nigeria’s general lack of security are rooted in, and dictated by, the logic of this struggle for 
power. delimiting the country in terms of north and south rather than geopolitical zones, dep-
ersonalizes and undermines ethno-national identities, which are important building blocks for 
the Nigerian Federation. It may also result in the creation of structural flaws that will drive and 
sustain political tension within the polity and pose a serious challenge to the consolidation of 
nigeria’s democratization.
Key words: Power rotation; democratization; ethnic politics; geopolitical zones; Political 
restructuring.
introdUction
The leadership question in Nigeria has lingered unresolved for the last fifty-
three years. this is as a result of four factors: the ascendancy and continued dom-
inance of ethnicity as an aggregating tool, the retreat of nigerian federalism, the 
perception of an exclusive right to leadership by the northern political elite, and 
the backlash of opposition from other ethnic groups (ibeanu, 1999; Abubakar, 
2004; Babawale, 2007). These factors have not only intensified the intractability 
of the leadership question but have also served as an incentive for antagonistic 
politicking.
in the run-up to the 2011 general elections, debates and controversy between 
residents of nigeria’s geopolitical zones about the trajectory of the presidential 
baton brought to the fore the centrifugal tendencies of elite interests. Popular inter-
pretations of zoning and rotation by contending elite were not only flawed but 
also grossly misleading. while the elite dichotomization of the nigerian state, 
either in terms of north and south or geopolitical zones, can be analytically use-
ful, its relation to the 1999 nigerian constitution is arbitrary and, therefore, lacks 
legitimacy. these categorizations and differentiations were introduced into nige-
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ria’s political discourse to anchor the principle of rotation. the intent of this prin-
ciple is to ensure that all factions within the nigerian state occupy the presidency 
in turn.
President goodluck Jonathan’s declaration of intention to contest the 2011 pres-
idential election pitted regional elite against one another. the confusion and ambi-
guities attached to zoning and rotation fuelled and exacerbated ethno-regional 
claims and contentions. this confusion was powered by the crisis of personal 
ambitions, or what has been called ‘generational anxiety’(1) (samuel, 2007: 180). 
the perception that President Jonathan’s ambition was anti-unity and usurpative 
of the north’s presidential turn was rooted in the premise that the rotation of 
power was for an eight-year term. this premise fuelled assertions that Jonathan’s 
presidential ambition undermined zoning policy, and this threw the country into a 
hobbesian state of mutual ethnic war (Ajaero, 2010). what the 1999 nigerian 
constitution guaranteed was one term of four years (section 135 (2), constitution 
of the federal republic of nigeria, 1999). even the Peoples democratic Party 
(PdP) envisaged a single four-year term for its presidential candidates. According 
to Alli (2010), “the PdP in 1999 designed the zoning formula to give all the six 
geopolitical zones of the country a chance to have a shot at the presidency.(2) each 
zone was expected to enjoy a four-year term in the presidency after which the 
race would be thrown open.” the second four-year term is available only to an 
incumbent and is not automatic; it must be earned through a re-election.
this paper provides a deconstruction of arguments about the zoning and rota-
tion of presidential powers in nigeria, relying on informal interviews and second-
ary data. this is accomplished by reconstructing the analytical building blocks and 
constitutive elements of zoning and rotation, and their operational modalities within 
the generalized ambit of the PdP, and the 1999 nigerian constitution. it further 
considers the implications of these policies for nigerian democracy and the democ-
ratization process.
the  ethnicizAtion  And  reconfigUrAtion  of  democrAtic 
PArAmeters  
nigeria’s democracy is a product of domestic and international pressures. from 
a domestic perspective, the inconclusive political transition, which terminated in 
1993, was still an open sore that required treatment.(3) there was a groundswell 
of opposition from all segments of the nigerian polity to the late general sani 
Abacha and his regime. this necessitated the initiation of a transition program, 
which terminated suddenly upon the general’s death in 1998. the end of the cold 
war in 1989 brought democratization to the front burner of international agendas, 
leading to what has been referred to as the “third wave” of democratization (hunt-
ington, 1991).  
there is disagreement amongst scholars about the parameters of democracy and 
democratic governance, and especially about their universal applicability in the 
face of arbitrary classifications based on divergent ideological orientations. Democ-
racy functions, ideally, on three platforms: as an ideological and aggregating tool; 
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as a system that creates participatory space for the people; and as an effective 
guarantee against tyranny and a mechanism that enthrones social justice within a 
polity (howarth, 2001; igwe, 2002; nnoli, 2003; Babawale, 2007; ejumudo, 2010). 
embedded in the notion of democracy, therefore, are such empirical referents as 
competition, choice, mass participation, popular consultation, and an institutional 
platform for the articulation, sieving, and aggregation of ideological contestations. 
it is these empirical referents that made igwe (2002: 110) describe democracy as: 
“One of the finest examples of a working human contrivance whose basic objec-
tive is to promote human life and society.” the essence of democracy is the open-
ing of a system to ensure widespread involvement of the citizenry in the political 
process; it is the people, and not the state, that drive democracy. the task of the 
state consists mainly of enabling the enthronement of democratic culture by set-
ting up relevant institutional frameworks in accordance with the constitution, fash-
ioning rules of engagement, and supervising adherence to them. democracy, rather 
than being a system, is a process involving the popular will of the people to install 
and sustain government. But it is misleading to limit a democratic system to pop-
ular will without making reference to minority rights. the whole question of social 
justice involves the mainstreaming of minority rights within the political schema. 
the economic commission for Africa stated: “while majority rule may be the 
hallmark of liberal democracy, the protection of minority rights constitutes the 
major strength and resilience of any democratic system.” (economic commission 
for Africa, 2009: 26) 
the very idea of power rotation and zoning seems antithetical to the ideals of 
democratic culture. in 1999, when democratic governance was restored in nigeria 
after a long period of military rule, there was a tacit consensus(4) among the polit-
ical elite to limit electoral choices for the presidency to southern candidates (Agbaje, 
2010). this resulted in the nominations of chief olusegun obasanjo for the PdP 
and chief olu falae for the coalition of All Peoples Party (now All nigeria Peo-
ples Party, AnPP), and Alliance for democracy (Ad) (omotola, 2010). 
this 1999 limitation of presidential nomination to southern candidates laid the 
foundation for ethnic democracy, a nigerian variant of the extended threats to 
democratic culture. the larger picture included the universal monopolization of 
democracy by moneyed individuals, which resulted in depriving the masses of 
their democratic rights, and the enthronement of what Andreas schedler has called 
“electoral authoritarianism” (omotola, 2010: 537). contrary to Ake’s (1996: 6) 
argument, it was not the liberal democracy bequeathed to nigeria that was respon-
sible for the ethnic flavoring in its democracy, but the wholesale manipulation of 
primordial sentiments by the elite in furtherance of their interests. 
the ethnicization of democracy was rationalized on the premise that democracy 
is a malleable social construct intended to fit into the peculiar circumstances of 
different nations. in nigeria, ethnicization was used to bridge feelings of margin-
alization and social injustice, exemplified in the long political dominance of the 
north (onwudiwe, 2004). But the ethnicization of democracy has had its own 
problems. it has created new tensions between ethnic groups about the proper 
interpretation of the presidential turn. it was this unresolved issue that underpinned 
political tensions in the run-up to the 2011 presidential election and the post-elec-
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tion violence that erupted in the aftermath of President goodluck Jonathan’s elec-
toral victory. hundreds lost their lives in northern and central nigeria in the ensu-
ing violence (Amnesty international, 2012). Ahmed (2010) attributes the violence 
to the emergence of armed youth gangs who purported to protect the interests of 
their ethnic groups in the fallout of ethnic democracy. in effect, the inability to 
fine-tune power rotation arrangements not only increased tensions within the pol-
ity but also limited the range of choices available to the electorate. Both of these 
factors have far-reaching implications for nigeria’s democratization efforts. 
the leAdershiP QUestion in nigeriA
the leadership question in nigeria revolves around the possibility of every 
indigenous ethnic group ascending to the presidency. structural manoeuvrings over 
the years, such as the distortion of the federalist principles by successive military 
regimes, the conferment of superordinate powers on the federal government, its 
control of the country’s enormous resources, and the ascendancy of a culture of 
parasitism, have contracted the federal space and made northern nigeria a hege-
monic power centre. the exclusive dominance of the presidency by northerners 
since nigeria’s independence underpins ethno-national agitations that threaten the 
polity. nigeria’s leadership question is directly linked to the country’s inability to 
satisfactorily resolve the contradictions of its statehood. As Achebe (1984: 1) has 
stated, “the nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to 
rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hall-
marks of true leadership.”
the seemingly intractable leadership question in nigeria is necessarily a carry-
over from the colonial era. emergent post-independence leaders deepened this 
problem when they assumed the role of retreating British colonialists. the nation-
alistic struggle, which pitted eastern and western regions against the colonial 
administration, created particularistic affinity between colonial Britain and the “doc-
ile” north. the British were able to achieve a transfer of power to the north by 
outright manipulation of the system in two important ways. first, they manipu-
lated census figures to favor the North by ascribing numerical demographic supe-
riority to it. British colonialists abrogated the principle of north–south parity in 
the allocation of seats in parliament and, in its stead, introduced a population-
weighted principle that allocated 52% of the seats in parliament to the north (osa-
ghae, 1998; mimiko, 2006). second, they tactically delayed nigerian independence 
so that necessary human capital could be put in place in the north before grant-
ing independence. thus, since 1960, except for the interregna of January–July 
1966; 1976–1979, and August–november 1993, the north had held on to power 
until 1999 (oladeji, 2006; Babawale, 2007).
the northern elite, who took over from retreating British colonialists, ruled both 
as military autocrats and democrats for forty out of Nigeria’s fifty-three years as 
an independent state. in the process, they reinvented a skewed nigerian federal 
structure that disaggregated and domiciled a large portion of regional power at 
the federal level. the outcome of this usurpation was the creation of an imperial 
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presidency that was all powerful when determining the socio-economic and polit-
ical fate of the elite class (the federal government wields monopolistic and unbri-
dled control over nigeria’s wealth).(5)
it would seem simplistic and theoretically barren to anchor the leadership ques-
tion solely within the realm of ethnicity. such a mono-analytical typology would 
be inadequate for appreciating the pressures exerted on both the selection process, 
and the ascension to the Nigerian presidency. Within the configuration of the Nige-
rian state, even with distortions and tinkering to its federal system, it is impossi-
ble for any of the over 300 ethnic groups to ride roughshod over others to ascend 
to the presidency. the processes leading to the occupation of the presidency have 
always been manipulated within elite ranks. the incorporation of a clause of fed-
eral character in the 1999 nigerian constitution is intended to assuage and mini-
mize the tensions that often accompany the sharing of state resources among the 
elite (section 14 (3) & (4), nigerian constitution 1999).
fears of marginalization, expressed by the minority ethnic elite in the pre-inde-
pendence era, stemmed from the possibility of a majoritarian card being played 
to their detriment. their demands consisted of creating separate regions for the 
western, eastern and northern minorities. the willinks commission, which addressed 
complaints, observed in their report that, “the minorities who have appeared before 
us have thought of separation as a remedy for their troubles. But unity might have 
the same effect, and though unity cannot be manufactured by a commission, 
machinery can be devised which aims rather at holding the state together than at 
dividing it (ojiako, 1981: 44).”
the commission’s proclivity for the maintenance of nigerian unity clouded its 
sense of justice and led them to recommend a political solution that was not in 
accord with the wishes of the minorities. it recommended among others, the con-
stitutional entrenchment of a Bill of rights and the creation of special and minor-
ity Areas under the direction of boards to address the peculiar problems of the 
niger delta (ojiako, 1981; osaghae, 1998). the willinks commission and the 
British government, rather than address the fears of the minorities, which princi-
pally hinged on their right to assume the position of leadership in nigeria, glossed 
over the issue, hoping that the emergence of national political parties after inde-
pendence would help to allay such fears (osaghae, 1998).
the immediate post-independence bourgeoisie attempted to allay the fears of 
minorities by tinkering with, and creating, the midwest out of the western region, 
and also attempted to carve minority regions out of the eastern and northern 
regions before a military coup d’état changed the political permutations. however, 
subsequent agitation by minority states was more a product of an elite strategy of 
realignment and inter-regional alliances for the capture of power than it was for 
justice. 
The leadership crisis in Nigeria was intensified and sustained by politico-eco-
nomic forces. Onimode (1983: 64) notes that, “After flag independence, political 
power was handed over to reactionary bureaucratic bourgeoisies who were more 
anxious to manipulate state power to strengthen their tenuous legitimacy and frag-
ile economic base,” than to address any national issue. the protection of the eco-
nomic well-being of the elite became the raison d’être for leadership because 
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nigerian leaders who took power had no secure source of material acquisition 
and, therefore, used political power for accumulation (Ake, 1981). even those who 
had a “secure material base” soon discovered it was more lucrative to be in gov-
ernment than to chart an independent course in the murky waters of business. 
thus, leadership in post-colonial nigeria became a tool for elite economic aggran-
dizement as the state was transformed into a major source of rents through con-
tracts, foreign exchange allocation, direct credit at below-market interest rates, tar-
iff concessions, and a gamut of incentives (ikpeze et al., 2004). the seeming eth-
nic agitation for zoning was merely an elite quest to create an opportunity for 
ascension to power, and not a manifestation of ethno-national patriotism.
PoliticAl crises And the logic of PoliticAl restrUctUring
Political crises in post-independent nigeria are neither new phenomena nor iso-
lated occurrences. They are an integral part, and defining characteristic, of the 
nigerian political experience. the foundation for nigeria’s political crises was laid 
by the 1914 amalgamation of southern and northern protectorates by lord lugard. 
Although, the amalgamation was convenient for the British, as it used the south’s 
enormous resources to augment northern deficits, it has remained the Achilles’ heel 
of nigerian politics. 
the history of political crises in nigeria shows a trajectory from regional to 
national settings. The earliest political crises lit regional fires with only the smoke 
reaching the national arena. these crises were engendered by elite struggles for 
power. the participation of the federal government in such regional political cri-
ses was aimed at weakening the hold of dominant parties in these regions and 
paving the way for the entrance of rival parties. the African continental Bank 
(AcB) saga of 1956 in the eastern region, the middle Belt uprising triggered by 
agitation for a separate region in the north, and the 1962 Awolowo/Akintola cri-
sis that culminated in emergency rule in the West, exemplified Nigeria’s region-
alization of political crises (ojiako, 1981; coleman, 1986; minahan, 2002). the 
source of this regionalization of political crises, especially with respect to leader-
ship, could be traced to three basic factors: first, the sweeping powers conferred 
on the regions by the 1951 macpherson constitution, which not only ignited 
regional political party structures but also harnessed and directed all energies to 
the regions; second, regional governments that were superior to the federal gov-
ernment; and third, the fact that regional governments had fiscal control of their 
regions and, thus, were stronger agents in the dispensation of patronage. these 
factors, and fear of being excluded in governance, led Awolowo to institute a pan-
yoruba group based on the theory of regional nationalism. As coleman (1986: 
350) has stated:
the dominant theory of the Action group leaders was that under the cir-
cumstances then prevailing in nigeria the only certain avenue to power was 
a regional political party.... thus, during the three-year period 1948–1951, 
tribalism and regional nationalism became not only the most legitimate but 
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the most effective means for educated nationalists to secure power.
the military coup d’état initiated in 1966, changed the political landscape, 
imposing a military command structure over the administration of nigeria, with 
the regions serving as outposts of the federal government. the balkanization of 
the regions, from 4 to 12 states, and eventually to the present 36-state structure, 
was not a response to agitation by minorities per se. several overriding consid-
erations underpinned the process. first, the regime had to deal with the issue of 
regime legitimacy in the face of the Biafra challenge; second, new fiefdoms had 
to be created to expand the dispensation of patronage; and third, the then military 
regime felt that balkanization tended to diminish the influence of dislodged poli-
ticians, thus paving the way for the strengthening of their own hold on power 
(suberu, 1998).
thus, instead of the states serving as component units in an ideal federal struc-
ture, they became mere appendages of the federal government. Another strategy 
used by the military was the collapse of the federal fiscal system, and the vest-
ment of “absolute powers” in the federal government. this development led to an 
elite convergence at the centre, seeking access to state resources. the constitu-
tional consolidation of the military definition of a strong center, and distorted fis-
cal structure, underpinned the de-regionalization of political crises and the present 
national character.
the creation of a strong center with unfettered access to nigeria’s fabulous oil 
wealth, and various uses to which the power of incumbency could and had been 
lent, stimulated and reconfigured elite interests. The bridging of political space in 
1993 that led to a two-party structure, and the surprise victory of the late chief 
M.K.O Abiola, exposed the artificiality of ethnicity and religion as tools of polit-
ical aggregation. the unfortunate annulment of the election raised emotions that 
were not previously factors in nigeria’s restructured federal system. these emo-
tions naturally led to the interpretation of the annulment as a manifestation of the 
north’s perception of “presidential birthright” and intolerance toward other ethnic 
groups’ aspirations to nigerian leadership. the ethnic interpretation ascribed to the 
annulment not only eroded gen Babangida’s (1985–1993) hold on power but also 
threw up the logic of political restructuring in the form of zoning and rotation of 
power, something the north opposed in the 1994–1995 constitutional conference 
(onwudiwe, 2004: 273).
the dominance of presidential power by the north and the annulment of the 
June 12 presidential election combined to place zoning, and rotation of the pres-
idency among majority and minority ethnic groups, at the forefront of the con-
stitutional conference convened by gen. sani Abacha (1993–1998) between 1994 
and 1995. At the inauguration of the 380-member conference, gen. Abacha had 
advised the conference to develop:
An inclusive system, which will guarantee a stable society through its sen-
sitive accommodation of all shades of political opinion harnessed by full 
participation of all the component units of our land... (and) restraints on 
government as will ensure that no man will be oppressed and no group will 
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dominate or be marginalized. (cited in Amuwo, 1998: 81)
the logic of zoning and rotation of power emerges from principles of equity, 
justice and fair-play that consider every ethnic group to be a bona fide constitu-
ent of the nigerian federation. Amuwo (1998: 80) perceptively elaborates on this 
logic:
there are at least two mutually exclusive “logics” of political restructuring 
and constitutionalism: formal or premeditated logic and informal or pre-
emptive logic. The first relates to a genuine attempt, at a crisis point in the 
life of a nation, by leaders thrown up by the crisis to resolve them, mutatis 
mutandis, to the satisfaction of the mass-majority. the second works in the 
opposite direction by a deliberate undermining of the formal restructuring 
process in order that extra-or non-national interests may find full expression.
these two logical approaches characterized the constitutional conference of 
1994–1995. the mood of the country then shifted towards forging a new national 
consensus anchored to an inclusive system devoid of marginalization or oppres-
sion. the north (which had held onto power for 31 of then nigeria’s 34 years of 
statehood) was opposed to the proposal to incorporate the principle of rotational 
presidency into the nigerian constitution (nwala, 1997; onwudiwe, 2004). there-
fore, the non-inclusion of the principle of rotational presidency in the eventual 
1999 nigerian constitution by the regime of gen. Abdusalami Abubakar (1998–
1999) was in keeping with the hegemonic wishes of the northern oligarchs. it 
provided the political latitude for national dominance. despite constitutional non-
inclusion, there appeared to be an implied agreement amongst the elite to incor-
porate rotation into the political dispensation that took effect in 1999. this was 
demonstrated through sponsorship by all political parties of two yoruba candidates 
in the 1999 presidential election.
contextUAlizing  zoning  And  rotAtion  of  Power  in  the 
nigeriAn  Body  Politic 
By virtue of their long occupation of the seat of power (both in military and 
democratic regimes), the Northern elite developed an affinity for state power and 
thus perceived it as their birthright. this perception informed the claim by Usman 
Bugaje that proponents of the sovereign national conference hated the north and 
were plotting the collapse of the country (cited in Amuwo, 1998: 84). to the 
northern elite, the obasanjo presidency was a “loan” to the south to compensate 
and assuage anxieties that emerged over the June 12 electoral debacle. in other 
words, the “ceding” of power to the south-west was a force majeure that had to 
be accommodated and endured while it lasted. this was evident in the eight-year 
regime of President obasanjo (1999–2007) with the provocative promulgation of 
sharia laws, religious riots and threats of impeachment, all of which created ten-
sion in the body politic.
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the 1994–1995 constitutional conference clearly demonstrated an understand-
ing of nigeria’s political problems when it consensually resolved that the presi-
dency should rotate between the north and south, which was dutifully included 
in section 229 (1–5) of its draft constitution (nwala, 1997; Agbaje, 1998). yet 
the 1999 constitution, which was supposedly a product of that conference, did 
not contain these provisions. nevertheless, the spirit of power rotation guided the 
post-military transition that produced the obasanjo presidency in 1999.
Until recently, zoning and rotation of presidential power have not been deliber-
ate national policies, or political party policy. earlier attempts at democracy (1960–
1966 and 1979–1983) did not consciously include zoning or rotation of presiden-
tial power because of the ethnic composition or flavor of the parties. The major 
preoccupation of these ethnically-entrenched political parties was to gather consti-
tutionally required percentages to enable the formation of government. in other 
words, it was considered a given by the northern elite that the majority must 
always have its way. Because the military (which had ruled both consecutively 
and intermittently) manipulated the state patronage system in favor of the north, 
its elite had greater resources with which to execute their political agenda. only 
chief m.K.o Abiola, owing to his unfettered access to state patronage, was able 
to contest and win the 1993 presidential election.
the impetus for zoning and rotation of power was ostensibly derived from 
efforts to create a sense of belonging amongst ethno-national elite groups in the 
face of the inadequacies of federal character principles. Aper Aku argued that, 
“zoning can rescue minorities from political obscurity and at the same time guar-
antee majority interests, foster national stability and ensure the success [of democ-
racy] (onwudiwe, 2004: 273).” 
Arguments about zoning and rotation are suffused with conceptual confusion. 
zoning and rotation tend to be confused with federal character principles enshrined 
in the 1999 constitution. nwala and ogbonna (2010) fell into this trap when they 
argued that the principles of zoning and rotation were implicit in section 14 (3) 
of the 1999 nigerian constitution, which addresses the federal character principle. 
this was misleading. the principles of zoning and rotation, and those of the fed-
eral character, are entirely different, and relate to different scenarios. while the 
principles of zoning and rotation are anchored on the delineation of nigeria into 
six geopolitical zones for manageability, the principle of federal character refer-
ences the thirty-six states of the country and Abuja, and is concerned with repre-
sentation in national government (section 14 (3), first & second schedule, con-
stitution of the federal republic of nigerian, 1999).
it is necessary at this point to clarify the concepts of zoning and rotation. these 
concepts are mutually reinforcing. there cannot be rotation unless the issue of 
zoning is resolved. constitutionally, zones do not properly exist in the nigerian 
polity. Such categorizations as North, South, and other geopolitical zones are fluid 
and arbitrary terms used in political discourse and are designed merely to serve 
as guides to confer meaning and boundary. Because there is no constitutional basis 
for a zone structure, there cannot be, constitutionally speaking, zoning.
the absence of an authoritative constitutional beacon as a guide for what con-
stitutes nigerian political zones does not invalidate their usefulness as essential 
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categories. it only makes it impossible, indeed unproductive, to sustain an argu-
ment about the trajectory and rotation of power. The only official document that 
makes any reference to zones and zoning outside Abacha’s summarization of the 
outcome of the 1994–1995 constitutional conference, presented in his 1995 inde-
pendence day national broadcast, is the PdP constitution (nwala, 1997: 201–203). 
the PdP constitution provides that: “in pursuance of the principle of zoning, jus-
tice and fairness, the party shall adhere to the policy of rotation and zoning of 
party and public elective offices and it shall be enforced by the appropriate exec-
utive committee at all levels.” (section 7 (2), constitution of the Peoples demo-
cratic Party, 1998)
since their inception, the structures of the PdP and other political parties have 
reflected and borne the imprimatur of six geopolitical zones. The major organs 
and structures of the PdP and other major political parties are not patterned after 
northern or southern zones, but six geopolitical zones, each having its own con-
gress, executive and working committees (nwala & ogbonna, 2010). the PdP 
categorization of zones consists of north-central, north-east, north-west, south-
East, South-South, and South-West, and from these we can distil definitional cri-
teria for zoning. the boundaries set by the contemporary wave of debates on the 
subject are inadequate. the basis for current debates on zone, zoning, and rota-
tion of power is purely political and does not include other holistic determining 
variables. 
the most important determining variable in national aggregation is ethnicity. 
Because of the permeation of ethnicity into every sector and stratum of social and 
political discourse, it has become the primary basis for the distribution of state 
wealth. for this reason, such categories as gender (men–women), age (youth–old 
men–women) and class (elite–masses) that constitute distinct zones, are subsumed 
under ethnicity, because any man, woman, youth, elite personage, or commoner 
would be asked their ethnic affiliation. Still, any definitional postulation that glosses 
over socio-cultural and economic factors for zoning and rotation would most cer-
tainly be considered analytically weak and unhelpful. it is therefore not adequate 
to conceptualize zoning merely as the alternation of key national political offices 
(the offices of the President, Senate President and Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives) amongst the six geopolitical zones (ezeife, 2010). zoning and rota-
tion of power are two mutually reinforcing concepts that connote recognizable 
delimitation, distribution, and alternation of key national political offices in such 
a way that key cleavages in the political system such as gender, age grouping, 
and socio-economic status subsumed within the ambit of ethnicity are properly 
categorized, streamlined, and positioned either clockwise or anti-clockwise as the 
basis for power alternation within the polity.
the PdP constitution not only recognized the imperative of zoning and rotation 
as irreducible requirements for engendering feelings of inclusiveness and belong-
ing, it also implied an order of rotation in 1999. therefore, contrary to arguments 
that there was no order or sequence of rotation (nwala & ogbonna, 2010), there 
was indeed an inferable order evident within the restrictions imposed by the PdP 
in 1999: it closed its doors to northern presidential aspirants and only considered 
presidential aspirants from the south-east, south-south and south-west. the late 
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Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, a North-Easterner, who defied the zoning and rotation prin-
ciple to purchase the presidential nomination form, was refunded his nomination 
fee and was forbidden from contesting (ezeife, 2010). this indicates that the PdP 
operated its zoning and rotation principle not as a tabula rasa, but as recognizing 
the realities of northern domination of the presidency since 1960.
the contemPorAry deBAte on zoning And rotAtion: whose 
Power, whose tUrn to wield it?
there is a wealth of arguments and counter-arguments about zoning and rota-
tion of power relating especially to questions of whether they, in fact, exist, how 
they came into existence, the nature of zone structures, and the modalities for 
operationalizing them. most arguments lack dispassionate objectivity, as they are 
steeped in an antagonistic mindset of “us” versus “them.” As we have already 
noted, zoning and rotational principles have not, until recently, been a part of 
nigeria’s political experience. they are concepts of circumstance that were con-
sciously introduced into nigeria’s political lexicon after the annulment of the June 
12, 1993 presidential election. As Ezeife (2010) asserts, Abiola did not benefit 
from any zoning arrangement but, rather, contested as a nigerian and won on 
account of his tremendous national profile.
The forum in which zoning and rotation of power was first introduced, and won 
adherents, was the constitutional conference of 1994–1995. the conference reached 
agreement on two volatile issues: it accepted zoning and rotation of power, and 
also demarcated the country into six geopolitical zones. it is important to recol-
lect the positions of northern and southern delegates in that conference: while 
most southern delegates endorsed the demarcation of the country into six geopo-
litical zones and rotation of power amongst them, northern counterparts moved 
from total rejection of the idea of rotation to reluctant acceptance, subject to the 
basis of north and south zones (Agbaje, 1998: 127).
Zoning and rotation of power received official endorsement from Gen. Abacha 
in his independence day broadcast on 1 october, 1995. his pronouncement granted 
official recognition to power-sharing. The fact that Abacha did not include them 
in a decree did not detract from their official recognition. Indeed, the basis for 
the current debate about zoning and rotation has stemmed from the official status 
it acquired during the Abacha regime. not only did gen Abacha recognize the 
demarcation of nigeria into six geopolitical zones corresponding to the present 
geopolitical framework adopted by the PdP, he also recognized that power rota-
tion would occur amongst these zones, and not just between north and south 
(olaitan, 1998: 127). the idea of zoning and power rotation was not restricted to 
the office of the President, but also extended to the offices of Vice-President, Sen-
ate President, and speaker of the house of representatives. gen Abacha asserted 
that these principles, “shall be entrenched in the constitution and shall be at the 
federal level and applicable for an experimental period of 30 (thirty) years.” 
(olaitan, 1998: 127)
following the death of Abacha in 1998, and the ascension of gen Abdulsalami 
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Abubakar as the head of state, the resultant constitution omitted the provisions 
on zoning and rotation of power. it is instructive to note that the choice and adop-
tion of chief olu falae and gen. olusegun obasanjo (retd.) were not done just 
to appease the nAdeco (national democratic coalition), “June twelvers”(6) and 
the south-west as generally believed, but also to allow the implementation of zon-
ing and rotation as already advanced by gen. Abacha and accepted by the polit-
ical elite. In other words, the Obasanjo presidency represented the first serious 
attempt to institutionalize zoning and rotation of presidential power in nigeria. 
The present debate on zoning and rotation is a reflection of the failure of the 
political elite. the nigerian political elite misused the opportunity offered to them 
by the 2005 national Political reform conference (nPrc) to settle several cor-
rupted areas in the country’s body politic, especially power sharing, resource con-
trol, and true federalism. the chairman of the Power sharing committee of the 
nPrc, dr. chukwuemeka ezeife, asserted that his committee had recommended 
that the presidency should rotate among the six geopolitical zones “such that no 
one zone should have a second chance to produce the president when there is a 
zone which has not produced the president once” (ezeife, 2010: 2). the sudden 
and unceremonious manner that characterized the end of the nPrc (as a result 
of resource control controversy) provided the obasanjo government with the excuse 
needed to suppress these recommendations and promote its hidden agenda for a 
third term in office (through the implementation of an unconstitutional tenure elon-
gation scheme). 
Various interpretations of zoning and rotation (based on geopolitical zones and 
north/south distinctions) led to presidential aspirations from all the geopolitical 
zones in 2007 except the south-west. the choice of the north-west by the PdP 
and obasanjo, which coincided with similar choices by major political parties such 
as the AnPP and Action congress (Ac) (now Action congress of nigeria, Acn), 
resulted in the election of the late President Umaru musa yar’Adua (2007–2010). 
Unfortunately President Yar’Adua died in office before the completion of his term 
of office, paving the way for the controversy that put the entrenchment of zoning 
and rotation to the test. 
the zoning and rotation controversy started with unnecessary bottlenecks cre-
ated by political elites who claimed loyalty to President yar’Adua (in contradic-
tion to the 1999 constitution of nigeria) when the long period of his indisposi-
tion and absence required a de facto Acting President. there was serious opposi-
tion to conferring this constitutional right on then Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan. 
the northern elite wanted an extra-constitutional measure that would ensure that 
another north-westerner emerged as a replacement to the late President yar’Adua. 
This mindset informed the reluctance and opposition to ratifying the Vice-President 
as acting President as stipulated by the nigerian constitution. eventually, thoughts 
of “political contraptionism” gave way to constitutionalism and dr. goodluck 
Jonathan assumed the role of Acting President and, following the death of Presi-
dent yar’Adua in 2010, that of President.
Constitutionally, President Jonathan merely fulfilled the law in completing 
Yar’Adua’s term of office. In the run-up to the 2011 presidential election, argu-
ments moved from Jonathan’s eligibility to complete yar’Adua’s term, to contest-
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ing the office based on zoning. The core of the zoning argument was that if Pres-
ident Jonathan ran, he would be breaking the “gentleman’s agreement” on zoning 
and rotation of power. this argument employed an eclectic logic that hinged on 
constitutionalism, morality and integrity.
the only institutional documents that could be referred to for insight as to Pres-
ident Jonathan’s eligibility were the 1999 nigerian constitution and the PdP con-
stitution. the nigerian constitution guarantees every nigerian the right to vie for 
any elective office, subject to meeting the stipulated conditions for that office. The 
PdP constitution also recognizes this right, as well as the principles of zoning 
and rotation of power in the exercise of that right. the PdP constitution neither 
envisaged nor provided a leeway for a possible force majeure, and this formed 
the basis for the controversy about the presidential aspirations of President good-
luck Jonathan in 2011. however, the original intention of incorporating zoning 
and rotation into the PdP constitution was to give all six geopolitical zones of 
the country a chance to assume the presidency. A representative from every zone 
was expected to enjoy a four-year term in the presidency after which the race 
would be thrown open (Alli, 2010).
even though former President obasanjo did not keep to the four-year term out-
lined in the PdP convention on zoning and rotation of power, this recalcitrance 
did not invalidate the position of the party on a four-year term for each of the 
zones. in fact obasanjo’s second tenure was given to him at the discretion of the 
expanded national caucus of the PdP (Alli, 2010).
the nigerian constitution only guarantees a four-year term to the President 
(section 135 (2), nigerian constitution, 1999). A second term is not automatic, 
and the President must receive a fresh mandate through re-election. thus, a sec-
ond term is only available to an incumbent. it was illogical for the north-west, 
or any zone that did not have incumbency, to insist on or argue for the exclusion 
of President Jonathan, or any candidate from the south, from the 2011 presiden-
tial election. 
if we follow the intended meaning and purpose of zoning and rotation of power, 
as adopted by the nigerian political elite, there needed not be any controversy 
about the presidential aspirations of goodluck Jonathan. indeed his presidential 
aspirations fell within the ambit of the real meaning of zoning and rotation. the 
north-west had taken its turn with the presidency of the late President yar’Adua. 
whether by north/south categorization or geopolitical zone structure, President 
Jonathan’s ambitions did not imperil these principles; rather, they reinforced the 
concepts of zoning and rotation.
the 2011 presidential election provided the basis for testing various interpreta-
tions of zoning and power rotation. While the PDP fielded Goodluck Jonathan as 
its presidential candidate, who had earlier defeated Alhaji Atiku Abubakar in the 
party’s primaries, other political parties fielded candidates from across the geopo-
litical zones. the frontline political parties then, especially the congress for Pro-
gressive change (cPc) and the Action congress of nigeria (Acn), presented 
general muhammadu Buhari and mr. nuhu ribadu, respectively, as their candi-
dates. Both candidates are from the north-west zone.
the political strategy of the cPc and Acn was to take advantage of the seem-
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ing discontent in northern nigeria, stemming from disagreements about zoning 
and power rotation, to gain electoral leverage. the PdP and goodluck Jonathan 
won the April 21, 2011 presidential election, but this popular mandate of the Pres-
ident did not assuage disagreements about zoning. rather it ignited violence across 
the northern states of nigeria, leading to the unfortunate deaths of over 800 peo-
ple (human rights watch, 2011). some have suggested that the insecurity across 
nigeria since 2011, especially terrorist activities orchestrated by the Boko haram 
sect(7), are rooted in feelings of marginalization(8) on the part of northerners (Anya, 
2012). But no conclusive evidence exists to validate this view.
A recent unification of opposition parties, namely the ACN, CPC, All Nigerian 
Peoples Party (AnPP), a section of All Progressive grand Alliance (APgA), and 
others, to form the All Progressive congress (APc), may provide the platform to 
wrestle power from the PdP in the 2015 general election. the question of zon-
ing and power rotation may be the most serious problem for the unified party as 
President Jonathan is likely to contest for a second term.
conclUsion 
there is either a basic misunderstanding, or deliberate distortion, of the true 
meaning of zoning and rotation of power within the nigerian polity. it is this 
basic misunderstanding that led Udenta to assert:
the fundamental barometer that will measure the political temperature of 
the nation remains President Jonathan’s decision regarding his political future. 
if he decides to honour his party’s zoning arrangement through an unequiv-
ocal declaration that his mandate ends in 2011, not to be renewed again in 
the next election cycle, he will open enormous governance space and shut 
down the dominant space politics now occupies in the polity. But if he 
remains undecided, for the moment, about his true presidential ambition or 
even states clearly that he will contest the 2011 presidential election on the 
platform of his party, the PdP, he will shut down the governance space and 
widen the space [that] bitter, acrimonious politics will occupy (Udenta, 2010: 
6).
President Jonathan’s 2011 presidential pursuits could not have imperilled zon-
ing and rotation of power. the 1999 nigerian constitution guarantees only one 
four-year term, with an additional four-year term available to an incumbent upon 
re-election. since President Jonathan successfully completed yar’Adua’s term of 
office, the North-West could be deemed to have legitimately completed its term. 
with that completion, the presidency was then available for contest by other geo-
political zones. the zoning and rotation controversy was only a manifestation of 
desperation by certain interested political elites in the twilight of their political 
careers, and of fear that when the cycle revolves to their zones again, they will 
be irredeemably past their prime. As is customary with the nigerian elite, they 
have hidden under the canopy of ethnicity and regional marginalization to mask 
and advance their interests.
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notes
(1)	 owing to the age bracket of most of these politicians, the devolution of presidential pow-
ers outside their geopolitical zones means the foreclosure of their presidential ambition. 
this is so because by the time power revolves back to their section of the country, they 
would be too old to contest for the presidency. 
(2) the six geopolitical zones are: north-central comprising Benue, Kogi, Kwara, nasarawa, 
niger, and Plateau states; north-east comprising Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, gombe, 
taraba and yobe states; north-west comprising Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, 
sokoto and zamfara states; south-east comprising Abia, Anambra, ebonyi, enugu and 
imo states; south-south comprising Akwa ibom, Bayelsa, cross river, delta, edo and 
rivers state; and south-west comprising ekiti, lagos, ogun, ondo, osun and oyo 
states.
(3) late chief moshood Abiola was presumed to have won the presidential election held on 
12 June, 1993 but the military junta of general ibrahim Babangida (retd.) annulled the 
election, thus throwing the country into political chaos.
(4) the consensus that led to the emergence of two yoruba candidates as the nominees from 
the two political parties that contested the 1999 presidential election (the PdP and Ad/
APP alliance) was not a product of any formal agreement among the various ethnic groups 
in nigeria. the consensus was surreptitiously engineered by the then-military oligarchs, 
in alliance with their political counterparts, to compensate the yoruba nation for the an-
nulled 12 June, 1993 presidential election presumed to have been won by m.K.o Abiola, 
a yoruba man. in actuality, consensus was inferred based on the fact that the only north-
erner (Abubakar rimi) who purchased the presidential nomination form of the PdP was 
refunded the money he paid, and barred from running on the party’s platform.
(5) elite is a generic term used exclusively for the privileged segment of nigerian society. 
Membership into this segment is determined by status, defined in terms of position, and 
the extent of resources and power wielded by an individual. it encompasses the top-
ranking individuals and groups who are distinguished by their privileged status. the cat-
egorization of elite spans bureaucratic, political, intellectual, religious, and military seg-
ments of the society. In Nigeria there is no rigidity in elite configuration, as there is a ro-
bust circulation of elite, often based on alliances. the rentier system operating in nigeria 
creates the necessary collaborative platform for achieving the acquisition of state power 
for continued political domination.
(6) “June twelvers” is a term used to depict individuals and groups who agitated for the re-
validation of the 12 June, 1993 presidential election, which was presumed to have been 
won by the late m.K.o Abiola but was annulled by the military government of ibrahim 
Babangida (1985–1993).
(7) the Boko haram sect is a terrorist group in nigeria which has, since 2009, adopted sui-
cide bombing, targeted assassination, and deployment of bombs against the state and its 
people to create a sense of insecurity in the polity. Boko haram, literally means “western 
education is a sin.” the group does not have a cohesive demand list; its cardinal quest is 
the advancement of islam in nigeria. Although there are no concrete landmarks to con-
clusively attribute political motives to the Boko haram terrorist activities, the confession 
by President goodluck Jonathan that many members of his cabinet, as well as law en-
forcement agencies, are sympathizers of Boko haram could be regarded as implying that 
Boko haram hides behind religious proclamations to pursue political objectives.
(8) marginalization refers to the interpretation by certain northern politicians that, after the 
death of Umaru yar’Adua in 2010, nigeria’s presidency should have continued to be oc-
cupied by a northerner. the pattern of violence in northern nigeria suggests that not all 
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violent movements emanated from feelings of marginalization. for instance, the sharia 
riots that erupted across northern nigeria in the early 2000s had nothing to do with mar-
ginalization.
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